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Some kind of transcultural consent is strongly needed between Western and Islamic 
societies. Human rights can provide such consent but their traditional Western 
foundation remains alien to a large part of Muslim sensibilities. In address of this we 
must first turn our attention to the Islamic concept of 'maqasid'. By drawing upon 
Martha Nussbaum's list of basic capabilities and Tariq Ramadan's extensive reading 
of maqasid, we can prepare a sounder grounding for human rights within Islamic 
societies. Maqasid and capabilities call attention to the tradition of Islamic virtues. 
These so greatly overlap the Western ethics of virtues that they raise hope of 
transcultural cohesion. 
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I. PREMISE 
 
Most theoretical discussions in the area of ethics – both private and public – 
raise concepts which range amongst those such as rights, utility, social 
contract, personal autonomy and the like. These discussions are typically 
Western insofar as all those concepts belong to the Western philosophical 
and legal tradition. They are concepts that are deeply embedded in our 
culture and in which, as in the case of the outstanding example of 'human 
rights', we clearly see a strong influence of the Christian religion. Through 
natural law theory we can trace back the origins and first development of 
human rights to the work of the canonists between the 12th and 13th century: 
the ius naturale is understood as a power, faculty and subjective capacity 
inherent in the human person. It is an idea that expresses a need for the 
protection of the autonomy of men and women, for all their practical 
interests.1 
 
As is well-known, the idea of human rights (HR) has grown from this 
culturally specific origin – located in the philosophical, religious and legal 
culture of Western Europe – to become an international standard, applied all 
over the world through documents which have found general consent, even 
beyond Christian culture, such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948 (UDHR). However, a global consensus towards HR is 
confronted in particular by those in Islamic countries, who can adhere to very 
different and sometimes conflicting perceptions of HR and their 
compatibility with Islamic culture. Positions about HR can range from a 
                                                 
1 See B Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights (Scholars Press 1997), p 65. With regard to 
the large domain of ethics, a cautionary note should be put in place at the start: the 
general assumption underlying this paper is that there is only one ethics that works 
similarly for all human beings, despite their social, political and religious differences. 
I believe the ethics of virtues of classical Greece is what best embeds that core of 
ideas that has been transmitted through the centuries in the West by the natural law 
tradition and that we also find in Islamic ethics, thanks to the legacy of the Greeks. 
By contrast, the idea of 'rights' seems to be partially biased by modern Western 
individualism and misses the ideas of excellence and solidarity which, among others, 
are central to Islamic ethics. Evolution in the Islamic culture, as many contemporary 
voices show, may find a stronger place for HR, but so far my argument is that it is not 
yet a transcultural concept to the same extent that an ethics of virtues is. 
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claim that Islam invented rights already in the seventh century2 to a rejection 
of rights because they are inextricably connected with Western values and in 
opposition to Islamic traditional priorities and values. For example, in the 
Preamble to the UDIHR (Universal Declaration of Islamic Human Rights 
1990) 'the authors proclaim in the Arabic version that they believe that 
human reason (al-'aql al-bashari) is insufficient to provide the best plan for 
human life, independent of God's guidance and inspiration.'3 I believe it is 
correct to say that it is especially the second pole of opposition that gathered 
more supporters in recent times, in which radical Islamist views seem to have 
often had the upper hand against moderate Muslims. A balanced 
understanding between HR and Islamic values can be found in the 1990 Cairo 
Declaration of Human Rights, although a careful reading may show some 
ineliminable differences with Western values and priorities. 
 
It is important to emphasise that there is no unanimous agreement about the 
role and position of reason in Islam, with Islam referring here to both Islamic 
religion and Islamic ethics. Some recent commentators argue in favour of the 
Islamic tradition within the scheme of political liberalism Rawls provided. 
Muhammad Fadel has developed an interesting argument according to 
which: 
 
(1) fundamental theological and ethical doctrines in the Islamic tradition 
privileged rational inquiry and deliberation as the preconditions to 
establishing political life, living a moral existence, and obtaining religious 
salvation, commitments which are either consistent with or require a 
political commitment to freedom of thought; (2) as a result of the centrality 
of rational inquiry in the quest for salvation and conceiving the basics of the 
ethical good life, Islamic theology and ethics placed relatively greater 
emphasis on the procedural integrity of inquiry rather than its substantive 
conclusions, and as a result Muslim ethical theory produced a system of 
normative pluralism that expressly recognized the burden of judgment; and 
(3) as a result of this normative pluralism, Islamic jurisprudence grew to 
recognize the legitimacy of rule-making based on arguments whose premises 
– while consistent with revelation – were non-revelatory and therefore that 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Abu'l A'la Mawdudi, Human Rights in Islam (Islamic Foundation, 
1980). 
3 A Meyer, Islam and Human Rights (Westview Press 1991), p 58. 
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Islamic law, as a historical matter, recognized the legitimacy of public reason 
arguments.4 
 
Fadel holds that the political commitment implicit in various pre-19th 
century Islamic doctrines is consistent with the 'constitutional essentials' of 
a politically liberal regime. What is most interesting, in my view, is the 
tradition of rational enquiry and debate, highlighted by Fadel, that 
characterises scholastic theology, moral theology and law. The Arabic term 
for the first is ilm-al-kalam, the science of speech or disputation in which 
Muslim theologians developed their metaphysical, ontological and 
epistemological doctrines. The object of kalam was to discover truth about 
being, about how humans obtain knowledge and about religious dogma 
through the use of reason. Moral theology or usul al-fiqh is centered on how 
God judges human acts. It is concerned with questions regarding the nature 
of moral enquiry and other questions on moral judgement: how both true and 
probable moral judgements are reached. Usul al-fiqh has many important 
tasks such as distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate ethical 
disagreement or identifying the 'data' that is relevant for ethical inquiry.5 
Finally, Fadel recalls fiqh or positive law whose contribution to our purposes 
is noteworthy because legal rules were developed within negotiable political 
commitments – rather than non-negotiable moral and theological 
commitments – and, so, they were reasonable rather than true rules.6 In 
short, he argues that because of the prominent role that reason played in the 
theological and legal discourses of Islam, we can plausibly derive a 
commitment to a society that provides space for free normative enquiry. 
Further, according to Fadel, the centrality of individual enquiry in Islamic 
salvation theory leads a committed Muslim to endorse openly liberal 
constitutional essentials, 'as they clearly provide sufficient political space for 
her to discover those truths necessary for her salvation'.7 
 
                                                 
4 M Fadel, 'The True, the Good and the Reasonable: the Theological and Ethical 
Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law' University of Toronto Legal Studies Series, 
Res.Paper n. 977206, pp 4-5. 
5 See Fadel (fn 4), pp 32-3. 
6 See ibid, pp 39-40. 
7 ibid, p 98. 
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'Rights discourse' is very clearly a field where confrontations between 
Western and Islamic culture have been continuous in time and explicit on 
contents.8 However, I want to argue that there are other conceptual areas in 
which exploration might yield riper fruits. One such area worth-exploring 
may be that of the ethics of virtues (EV) whose revival in the last decades has 
introduced many elements of innovation in a moral debate that was so far just 
a battlefield between utilitarian and Kantian theories. In my view, the move 
toward human development and excellence – which is the core of EV – is 
congenial to the proposal of looking at it as an area of potential transcultural 
consent, as a set of ethical values that are good for people belonging to 
different cultures.9 In a nutshell, the basic idea of my claim is that of looking 
for an area of transcultural ethical consent, setting temporarily aside the 
rights discourse because, notwithstanding certain declarations of allegiance 
to HR from the Muslim world, their rationalist and individualistic core flies 
in the face of the Islamic emphasis on God's guidance and inspiration.10 For 
this sort of reason a contractualist philosophy, such as Rawls', remains alien 
to most of Islamic culture although, if interpreted according to different 
lines, it might enjoy a better reception.  
 
I say 'temporarily setting aside' the rights discourse because I maintain that 
we cannot help thinking and acting in terms of rights: their influence on our 
liberal morality is pervasive also because of their legal counterpart. Legal 
rights give a crucial position to the rights discourse in liberal societies also at 
                                                 
8 I want to use the term 'discourse' rather than alternative terms such as 'framework' 
because I believe it gives a better rendition of that lively exchange of ideas and 
discussion that is common within – and outside – liberal societies with regards to 
'rights'. 'Discourse theories', including an important status for rights, have acquired 
a well-known standing after J Habermas's Facts and Norms (MIT Press 1996). 
9 I believe that EV may contribute a relevant set of values for constructing a more 
integrated 'overlapping consensus' (in Rawls's terms), but across cultures as diverse 
as Islamic and Western culture (see section V). 
10 Notwithstanding the limits of rights I am trying to describe here, we have to 
acknowledge the flexibility of the concept of rights that in recent decades has been 
incorporating many emerging social values, such as the so called rights of second and 
third generation (the former including especially economic and social rights, while 
the third generation includes, e.g., group and collective rights, rights to self-
determination, rights to intergenerational equity, etc.).  
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the political level.11 However, rights-based moralities, to use Raz's 
expression, are impoverished moralities which cannot make room for ethical 
concepts such as the virtues or supererogation.12 So, we have an exhortation 
to go beyond rights-based moralities and towards EV from a liberal thinker 
that can find a parallel in my attempt at retrieving ancient Islamic ethics of 
virtues to show its significant overlap with contemporary Western EV. 
 
What is the reason for such retrieval? The easy answer would be to consider 
the common roots of Western EV and Islamic EV in Greek ethics through 
the work of Avicenna, Averroes, Al-Farabi and Al-Ghazali, among others. As 
is well-known, Western culture has retrieved classical philosophy in the 
Middle Ages (from the 12th century onwards), after a long 'dark age', thanks 
to translation from the Arabic sources. Arabic philosophers had preserved 
and cherished the legacy of classical Greece and Western culture has 
benefitted much from this effort of preservation. As we shall see in some 
detail, the Arabic culture experienced in the Middle Ages a flourishing EV 
that was in the first place relying on the philosophy of great masters such as 
Plato and Aristotle but also, in the second place, synthetizing elements of the 
Islamic religion. Thus, it is easy to conclude that the common roots of 
Western and Islamic EV lead to a stronger area of consent than the rights 
discourse. 
 
Is this a satisfactory and persuasive answer to the problem of identifying an 
area of transcultural consent? There are various charges against such an easy 
solution because it seems to ignore the religious elements that have gained 
the upper hand in Islamic ethics. Therefore, if we want to give pride of place 
to the EV within Islamic culture, we need a fresh start. We need to find out 
whether there is a stronger connection between the virtues and Islam. I 
believe this connection can be found in the concept of maqasid (goals or 
purposes) whose development occupies a growing space in Islamic doctrine. 
We can rely on it for a two reasons: first, it is a teleological concept as much 
as the classical virtues; second, working through the maqasid we can weave a 
                                                 
11 I should emphasize how the discourse on human rights is one place where sharp 
distinctions between legal and political philosophy waters down, because of the 
strong interconnections between legal and political issues.  
12 See J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986), pp 195-6. 
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thread of continuity from the age of Al-Ghazali, who introduced the concept, 
to our age. Another more general reason to take the maqasid as a reliable 
concept in our path towards an Islamic EV can be derived a contrario, in my 
view, from the place of HR in Islamic thought. Notwithstanding some 
general declarations (that we shall consider shortly) on the role of HR in 
Islamic society, it is plausible to hold that what is crucial in Islamic ethics is 
the traditional tenet that Islam provides a scheme of duties not of individual 
rights. 
 
In reading documents such as the Preamble to the UIDHR what is worth 
emphasizing is the centrality attributed to human duties over human rights: 
insofar as the Islamic sources of principles and rules represent the divine will, 
they secure rights less than they ensure obedience to divine commands. To 
make things even clearer, some authors point out that while the Western 
perspective is anthropocentric, the Islamic one is theocentric. According to 
the latter there are no HR in the modern sense, but only rights that stem from 
man's primary duty to obey God.13 
 
If the argument for setting aside the rights discourse looks sound enough, my 
reasons for inquiring into the maqasid may be helpful in leading us in the 
direction of the virtues. The five foundational goals (maqasid al-Shariah) are: 
faith, life, property, intellect, and progeny. However, contemporary authors 
such as Tariq Ramadan emphasize that the Shariah calls for the cultivation 
and protection of 36 further maqasid among which there are dignity, welfare, 
knowledge, autonomy, etc.14 
                                                 
13 See A K Brohi, Islam and Human Rights (PLD 1976), pp 151-2. 
14 See T Ramadan, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (OUP 2009), pp 138-9. 
Ramadan builds his large 'pool' of maqasid with a reasoning that starts from the 
sacred text and includes a few passages: first, Sharia is based on two co-equal 
purposes, protection of religion and protection of welfare (maslaha); second, 
protecting these two founding pillars depends on protecting three further 
fundamental objectives: life, nature and peace; from here he introduces a third level 
based on the protection of 13 maqasid directed at promoting human wellbeing 
(dignity, welfare, knowledge, creativity, autonomy, development, equality, freedom, 
justice, fraternity, love, solidarity and diversity): finally, he says that the Sharia calls 
for the protection and promotion of 23 further maqasid concerning the inner being 
(education, conscience, sincerity, contemplation, balance and humility), the life of 
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My argument, in short, is that, it is through the retrieval of all human 
purposes included in the Shariah that we can focus – again – on the EV 
developed by classical Islamic philosophers. In other words, I believe we can 
make sense of the virtues in the Islamic tradition not only because of their 
crucial place in the ethics of great philosophers and theologians of Islam, such 
as Averroes, Avicenna, Al-Farabi and Al-Ghazali – to cite only the most well-
known – but also because the virtues may be taken as a concretization of the 
maqasid, as the purposes of the Shariah that become concrete through the 
exercise of the virtues. What I shall try to show is that there is a significant 
overlap between the classical virtues – as described by classical philosophers 
of Islam – and a large number of maqasid as they can be retrieved in the 
Shariah. I also find an important overlap in the interpretation of maqasid 
between contemporary authors such as Ramadan and traditional authors 
such as Al-Ghazali. Of course, I cannot claim that there is a perfect overlap 
between classical virtues – deriving from Greek philosophy – and the maqasid: 
an explicative case would be that of 'humility'. Humility is both a virtue for 
many Muslim philosophers and a maqasid included within the Shariah, but its 
core of self-denial runs against the characteristic self-centeredness of 
classical Greek virtues. In turn, humility finds its place also in Christian 
catalogues of virtues, such as Augustine's, that leave to the human being a 
secondary place with regard to God's guidance and commands. These few 
hints may lead us to the conclusion of the argument: although there is a large 
room for transcultural consent between Western and Islamic culture in the 
area of EV and maqasid, we should not forget that there is a gap between 
secular and religious catalogues of virtues that can be found both in the 
Western and in Islamic culture. Humility, for example, is praised as a central 
virtue both by Augustine and by Al-Ghazali, but it is unrecognized by secular 
                                                 
the being or the individual (physical integrity, health, subsistence, intelligence, 
progeny, work, belongings, contracts and neighborhoods) and the welfare of 
societies and groups (rule of law, independence, deliberation, pluralism, evolution, 
cultures, religions and memories). Ramadan is aware of the farfetched nature of his 
list: 'Contemporary times compel us to return to the texts and extract objectives that 
may have appeared secondary in the past' (p 140). This list, he says, must be 
considered as a provisional elaboration, always open to further openings depending 
on new scientific knowledge. 
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catalogues. Therefore, while finding a common path in the area of EV, we 
should bear in mind that, as we shall see, there is a larger area of consent 
between Christian and Islamic religious ethics than between Western secular 
and Islamic EV.  
 
In the new ethical picture that seems available according to my previous 
considerations one may wonder about the space left for the rights discourse 
that is so much on the banners in our times. I anticipate that, while its 
individualistic thrust clashes with the deep core of Islamic ethics – religious 
and community-oriented – there is still an important role to play for HR with 
regard to the virtues and maqasid. From this perspective, HR may be 
considered as spheres of protection that warrant the project of human 
development embedded in the virtues and in maqasid. In this way, rather than 
depending on deontological foundation, as it traditionally happens in liberal 
theories of rights, these would rely teleologically on considerations of 
wellbeing. As we shall see, this new ethical picture will attempt to overcome 
two typical liberal boundaries by, first, proposing a view of rights not only as 
individualistic, but also as community-oriented guarantees and, second, by 
setting human wellbeing in a religious context where virtues and maqasid may 
lead beyond the usual threshold. 
 
My quick hints should not give the impression that my approach may dispel 
all problems that the concept and the practice of rights raise in the Islamic 
culture. Rather, I believe that there are some difficulties that can hardly be 
entirely bypassed. In my view the two most relevant difficulties are the 
following. First, it is difficult to accept the idea that rights can only exist in 
relation to human obligations towards God, fellow humans and nature, as 
defined by the Shariah.15 Second, it is similarly difficult to accept the idea that 
the individual can neither be considered apart from society, nor can his rights 
be considered in conflict with those of the community.16 These are barriers 
against a transcultural understanding between the West and Islam that the 
ethical appoach of virtues may at least help to reduce. 
                                                 
15 See Abdul Aziz Said, 'Precept and Practice of Human Rights in Islam' (1979) 
Universal Human Rights 1, p 73. 
16 See Cherif Bassionni, 'Sources of Islamic Law and the Protection of Human Rights', 
in The Islamic Criminal Justice System (Oceana 1982), pp 13-4.  
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From my introductory remarks the first steps of the agenda ahead of us are 
quite clear. First, I want to address the problems of the rights discourse with 
regard to central declarations of Islamic rights, such as the UIDHR and the 
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam. I will focus on some of the 
most important rights included in these declarations in order to test their 
compatibility with the standard international view of HR and, alternatively, 
with the ethical approach of the virtues (section 2-3). Of course, this second 
comparison will be postponed to a later stage, after an exploration of maqasid 
al-Shariah and of the Islamic EV. Thus, as the third step we need to consider 
carefully the concept of maqasid al-Shariah, keeping in mind the goal of 
human development that is common to the virtues. I shall consider not only 
the five foundational goals of the Shariah already mentioned, but also the 
other maqasid enumerated by Ramadan. My assumption is that Ramadan's 
extensive interpretation of maqasid al-Shariah covers most of the area of 
values usually attributed to the EV, including also some other political 
principles (section 4). Finally, the second stage of this inquiry will be devoted 
to a thorough analysis of Islamic EV. I anticipate that insofar as we read 
important past philosophers of Islam, such as Alfarabi, Avicenna and 
Averroes, we find explicit references to Plato and Aristotle. Although they 
tend to neglect the major theoretical differences between Plato and 
Aristotle, we may find references to the 'end of human perfection' and to the 
employment of theoretical and practical wisdom which take this Islamic 
ethics very close to Western EV through the common roots of Greek 
philosophy (section 5-6-7). However, in inquiring into Islamic virtues we 
should always remember that a relevant part of Islamic ethics rejects to a 
certain extent the influence of the 'philosophers' – including not only Greek 
philosophers, but also some Muslim authors I have just quoted. As we shall 
see, in the work of Islamic thinkers, such as Al-Ghazali, 'revelation' takes a 
central position, but without excluding rational inquiry and, so, leaves wide 
room to argue for the compatibility of the concept of maqasid with that of the 
virtues to argue from maqasid to the virtues and opens the way for a sounder 
transcultural consent. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The rights discourse and particularly HR have a pervasive and influential 
appeal in the contemporary world, overcoming cultural and religious barriers. 
It is well-known that both in post-communist countries and in Islamic 
countries claims of freedom and equality are raised in the name of HR. The 
recent events of the so called 'Arab Spring' have shown the strength of the 
appeal of HR against tyrannical governments that violated the principles of 
freedom and equality of their citizens in many Mediterranean countries of 
the Islamic world. However, as the development of events seems to show, the 
push of HR was first accompanied and then overcome by the rise of Islamic 
traditional values. Those governments were charged not only with not 
respecting HR, but also with violating Islamic values whose hold on 
individual conscience seems, by now, stronger than the appeal of HR. 
 
In order to verify whether this is really so and why it is so, we need to inquire 
into the foundations of HR: What do they stand for in Western societies? 
Can those foundations be exported to a radically different culture such as 
Islam? In attempting to respond to these questions, I will develop an 
argument in three steps. First, I shall consider the birth and evolution of HR 
in the West as a sign of moral and social progress. Second, I will consider how 
HR have grown as an international standard capable of imposing 
transculturally its normative criteria. Finally, I shall tackle two important 
Islamic declarations of HR: the UIDHR (1981) and the Cairo Declaration 
(1990). From their examination we shall see how HR are understood in the 
Islamic context dominated by the Shariah. My conclusion here will point to 
the necessity of re-interpreting HR in the Islamic context according to the 
basic presuppositions of Shariah. 
 
The first point that deserves our attention is that HR belong to a modern 
Western tradition which first dates back to the growth of rationalist and 
humanist thought in European Renaissance and later to the culture of the 
Enlightenment. The protection against State's infringements and the 
development of individual freedom was the main concern of British and 
French thinkers whose ideas found expression at the end of the 18th century 
in the American Declaration of Independence (1776) and in the Déclaration 
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des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (1789). Thus, the historical evolution of HR 
was marked by the rise of American and European constitutions protecting 
individual – mostly negative – rights that granted people basic freedoms such 
as freedom of expression. It seems evident that at their core these concepts 
were 'individualistic', protecting the individual against the state.17 They also 
carried the important legacy of natural rights, addressed to the development 
of human personality, as a legacy of the Middle Age canonists.18 
 
Natural rights are ideal claims that can be invoked against other people or 
against the community as a whole to protect the human individual from 
infringements of their liberties. As is well-known, the evolution of natural 
rights has taken place in Europe in the last three centuries with a historical 
development described by T.H. Marshall19 as a path toward citizenship that 
goes from civil to political and, finally, to social rights.20 What should be 
noted with regard to Marshall's theory of the evolution of rights is that it was 
                                                 
17 A different position is developed by Samuel Moyn who takes human rights to have 
become the leading concept that we now know only from the 1970s on. Even in 1968 
other vindications were brougt about by students and protesters demanding a better 
world. It is only in the 1970s that human rights were looked at as a kind of 
international law capable of stewarding utopian norms and the mechanism of their 
fulfillment. See S Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Harvard University 
Press 2010). But consider also Rainer Forst's views according to which human rights 
are founded upon a Kantian idea of dignity: it is a moral foundation that downscales 
all internationalist defences of rights. See R Forst, The Right to Justification 
(Columbia University Press 2011). 
18 A reconstruction of the history of human rights as directed at favouring the 
development of human personality is offered by Lynn Hunt who uses 18th century 
novels (such as Rousseau's Eloise) to explain how the experience of reading raised 
individual autonomy in readers who identified themselves in the protagonists: 
'Human rights could only flourish when people learned to think of others as their 
equals, as like them in some fundamental fashion'. L Hunt, Inventing Human Rights 
(Norton Company 2008), p 58.  
19 See T H Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, (CUP 1950), pp 28-9.  
20 Marshall's scheme of the evolution of human rights should not lead us to forget that 
the rights discourse is much richer than what is possible to show in my sketchy 
summary: for example, so called rights of second and third generation give new 
impulse to the guarantees offered by human rights and especially the idea of 
'collective rights' included in the rights of third generation seems to go much beyond 
the usual 'individualistic' understanding of rights (see n 6). 
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directed by an ideal of substantive equality and aimed at legitimising an 
increasing degree of redistribution of resources. By contrast, our interest in 
the Islamic context is still only focused on the ideal of equal political rights 
within the Muslim community on the one hand and, on the other, equality 
between Muslims and religious minorities. The ideals of freedom and 
equality are central in all declarations of HR and can be considered among 
the major obstacles to the acceptance of HR within the Islamic culture. 
However, a quick look at the recent history of this acceptance may be helpful 
in our path towards the Islamic virtues, towards focusing on what may be 
proposed as a new ethical approach for transcultural consent between 
Western and Islamic culture. 
 
III. ISLAM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
As is well known, after World War II HR have grown as an international 
standard with enormous influence on different cultures. Documents such as 
the UDHR of 1948 or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966 and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) also of 1966 gained widespread consent. Not all 
Muslim states ratified these Conventions,21 but at least HR documents 
became a standard of values widely accepted or criticized. It is not my point 
here to follow the wide and lively debate about the extent of acceptance of 
HR in Muslim countries.22 Rather, I want to make a few points about the 
present situation of HR with regard to the Islamic culture. My few general 
points will then be tested against well-known declarations of Islamic rights 
such as the UIDHR and the Cairo Declaration of HR. 
 
A first point that should be emphasized for the understanding of all 
discussions about Islam and HR is the following: basically, where the 
Western man's perspective is anthropocentric, the perspective of Islam is 
theocentric. Man's only task is to serve His Maker.23 Typical principles of 
Western legal philosophy, such as humanism, individualism and rationalism 
are rejected by most Islamic authors insofar as they are taken to give rise to 
                                                 
21 See Meyer (fn 3), p 24. 
22 A helpful, though not updated account can be found in Meyer (fn 3), ch 2. 
23 See A K Brohi (fn 13), p 151. 
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all the rights without making any reference to God. Conservative Islamic 
authors start from the subordination of man to God and the Islamic law to 
justify the rejection of individual rights in favour of an emphasis on the 
concept of duties. Sometimes the rejection of individualism is also grounded 
on a model of communal solidarity that is premodern and does not confront 
the problems of modern nation states. 
 
The duty to respect rules of communal solidarity when the addressee is a 
modern nation state, with all its technological devices of control and possible 
repression of individual dissent, risks leaving individual freedom 
unprotected. Against the danger of oppressive government practices, Islamic 
authors either tend to think in terms of an idealized relationship between the 
ruler and the ruled in which the rulers just follow God's mandate. Or, in case 
of abuses by the ruler, they believe proper to appeal to the Shariah, if official 
action has violated some of its principles. However, it often happens in 
Islamic States that political government and religious authority are 
concentrated in the same hands, so there is no point in appealing to the latter 
against the former. 
 
Second, previous considerations lead us to think that there are good reasons 
for an independent standard of evaluation, such as HR, also in Islamic states, 
notwithstanding their differences of cultural heritage. However, HR have to 
confront not only the declared hostility of those Muslim positions which take 
HR as a concept coming from an alien culture, but also the more insidious 
challenge from cultural relativists. Cultural relativism was born in Western 
theory, but it has been quickly picked up by some Muslim authors. It 
maintains that comparisons among cultures on the grounds of an alleged 
universal standard of evaluation such as HR are impermissible. The so called 
UDHR only shows 'moral chauvinism and ethnocentric bias'.24 Islamic 
norms and values, relativists say, cannot be judged by the criteria of 
international law because these belong to the alien Western culture. 
 
                                                 
24 A Pollis, P Schwab, 'Human Rights: A Western Construct with Limited 
Application' in A Pollis, P Schwab (eds), Human Rights: Cultural and Ideological 
Perspectives (Praeger 1979), p 14. 
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Whatever the stance of cultural relativism in the general debate – and it 
should be emphasized that it is a concept developed in anthropology and 
moral philosophy rather than used in the field of law – one should consider 
the status of HR in Muslim countries according to the real extent of their 
acceptance or rejection. Even a quick survey may show that HR exercise 
some appeal in Muslim countries, despite their supposed conflictuality with 
Islamic values. 
 
Third, we should consider Islamization programs that have been carried 
forward by the governments of Iran, Pakistan and the Sudan between the end 
of the 1970s and the 1980s. They represented revolutionary upheavals 
controlled by conservative clerics, as in Iran, or autocratic leaders, as in 
Pakistan and Sudan. President Nimeiri and President Zia, of Sudan and 
Pakistan respectively, assumed the role of pious leaders, declaring that the 
tenets of Islam justified military dictatorship and the suppression of 
individual freedoms.25 Central in Zia's programme of Islamization was his 
undermining of the integrity and independence of the judiciary through the 
appointment of new judges with a religious education but deficient in 
professional qualifications. In Iran, after overthrowing the corrupt and 
despotic regime of the Shiah Reza Pahlavi, the clerics imposed a return to the 
roots of Islamic values, rewriting the constitution in order to insert a number 
of vague Islamic qualifications that changed the meaning of original rights 
provisions. Being vague enough to be always interpreted by clerics for 
application, HR were destined to be subject to Islamic principles in each and 
every case of conflict.26 Grass-root movements vindicating individual 
freedoms and HR in those years and later on (e.g. the so called 'Arab Spring') 
show the variegated perception of HR vis-à-vis the Islamic law in Muslim 
countries. Many observers, including some Muslim intellectuals, have 
denounced the abuses of rights and denials of freedom that characterized 
those regimes at that time. The lack of respect for human rights seems to go 
                                                 
25 Ironically, learned scholars from Sudan argue that the state should not attempt to 
enforce Sharia because that is contrary to the principles of Islam. Muslims should be 
left free to live according to the principles of Islam because Sharia involves a religious 
obligation for individuals rather than public coercion. See Abdullahi, Nahmed An-
Na'im, Islam and the Secular State (Harvard University Press 2008).  
26 See Meyer (fn 3), pp 30-42. 
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hand in hand with a political regime unrespectful of democratic consent. 
Current developments of the so called 'Islamic state' in the Middle East only 
confirm a strict relationship between Islamization, on the one hand, and 
violence and denial of freedom, on the other. 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties of reception of HR that were already 
pointed out, the international standard has met some degree of acceptance in 
Muslim countries. The UIDHR of 1981 and the Cairo Declaration of 1990 
show, on the one hand, the desire of many Muslims to come to terms with 
standards of evaluation which enjoy a widespread allegiance all over the 
world. On the other hand, many 'Islamic provisions' inserted in the articles 
on rights show the extent to which rights can be effectively protected and 
implemented. Just by way of exemplification, we may notice that many rights 
commonly belonging to HR catalogues, such as the right to liberty (article 
2a), right to justice (article 4a), right to freedom of expression (article 12a), 
right to disseminate information (article 12d), right to protest and go on strike 
(article 12 c) and others are all granted within the limits of Shariah 
requirements. In the English version of the UIDHR rights are qualified 
'according to the Law' and in the Explanatory Notes it is made clear that by 
the term 'Law' it is meant the Shariah, defined as 'the totality of ordinances 
derived from the Qur'an and Sunnah and other laws that are deduced from 
these two sources by methods considered valid in Islamic jurisprudence'.27 
The vagueness of the reference to Islamic jurisprudence leaves significant 
leeway in the interpretation of rights. If we also consider that in Islamic 
countries authorities in charge of interpretation do not have a standing 
independent of government, as it happens in Iran, we may conclude that the 
possibilities for an individual to demand protection against government 
abuses are minimal.28 
 
One could wonder whether almost ten years later the Cairo Declaration can 
mark any clear progress with regard to the international standard of HR. I 
believe we can identify a progress with regard to the treatment of women: 
women's subordination to men in the Islamic culture has been one of the 
most common charges put forward against declarations such as the UIDHR 
                                                 
27 UIDHR, http://www.alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.html, eng vers, p 16. 
28 See Meyer (fn 3), pp 86-9. 
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which did not have any clear provisions to protect women's rights. In the 
Cairo Declaration, after article 5 which confirms (as in UIDHR) the 
importance of the family as foundation of society, we find article 6 that states 
that: '(a) woman is equal to man in human dignity and has rights to enjoy as 
well as duties to perform'; however, it also adds that: '(b) the husband is 
responsible for the support and welfare of the family.' So, it seems that equal 
dignity is not paralleled by equal responsibility in taking care of the family. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, article 6 may be considered an attempt to 
meet the requirements of the international standard. 
 
Many standard rights provisions are aligned with the international standard, 
such as free movement (article 12), work (article 13) and property (article 15) 
but 'within the framework of Shariah'. Special attention is dedicated to the 
rights of the child (article 7) whose education is to be promoted 'in 
accordance with ethical values and principles of the Shariah.' The right to 
freedom of expression was guaranteed in the UIDHR (article 12) so long as it 
remains within the limits prescribed by the Law. These limitations are 
expressed even more clearly in the Cairo Declaration in which article 22 states 
that 'everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such 
manner as would not be contrary to the principles of the Shariah.' 
 
If one may have had the impression that at some point the Cairo Declaration 
left more leeway for interpretation in favour of the international standard of 
HR, the provision of article 24 comes to dismantle any illusion: 'all the rights 
and freedoms stipulated in this Declaration are subject to the Islamic 
Shariah.' 
 
Whatever individual freedoms and rights have been established in the 
Declaration, its authors want to emphasize the supremacy of the religious 
law, the Shariah. Their difficulties in finding a compromise are further 
illustrated in the Resolution n. 41/42, attached to the Cairo Declaration where 
we read that human rights are recognized as universal in nature, but they must 
be considered in an evolving context and taking into account the various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds (point 5). This appeal to 
contextualization is at odds with the recognition that it is necessary to 
achieve universality, objectivity and non-selectivity in the application of 
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human rights standards and instruments (point 4). In my view it is possible 
that this contradiction speaks in favour of further progress towards reaching 
the international standard of HR in the next years, at least in terms of 
declarations. Unfortunately, we all know that HR are also violated in 
countries which have thoroughly subscribed to the UDHR.  
 
To conclude my remarks on HR and Islam, it seems clear that, on the one 
hand, HR are a standard of evaluation that many Muslims find appealing as a 
protection against government abuses. On the other hand, however, the 
international standard of HR now in use is a Western conception that does 
not suit well Islamic sensibilities. A different proposal should try to remain 
grounded in HR, while integrating them with other values, coming close to 
the roots of Islamic values rather than pushing on the uncritical reception of 
Western values. 
 
IV. FROM RIGHTS TO MAQASID AL-SHARIAH 
 
These considerations leave us with the impression that Muslim countries and 
Islam as a religious culture are far from being alien to the rights discourse 
because rights are considered by appealing to large numbers of people – 
possibly even majorities – in many Muslim countries. HR and democracy are 
considered an important option for people who often come from a past of 
denial of individual freedoms. However, as noted already, Western emphasis 
on individual rights seems to remain foreign to the conscience of many 
Muslims whose ethical development is deeply rooted in Islamic religion. By 
contrast, the instances of individual freedom and human dignity that are 
embedded in HR are deeply rooted in the Shariah, according to many Muslim 
thinkers. Therefore, my strategy is that of considering carefully the maqasid 
al-Shariah in order to find in these fundamental purposes of Islam better 
ground for HR. What is proposed is a straightforward teleological 
foundation for HR that grounds the idea of rights on human wellbeing and 
development. Such a foundation on maqasid seems also to dovetail quite 
nicely with the proposal of emphasizing the Islamic EV in order to find a 
sounder basis for transcultural consent. 
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I have already gestured towards the idea that the EV is a more promising area 
of transcultural consent between Western and Islamic ethics than HR. The 
reasons for this view can be easily explained. While rights in Western ethics 
have a typical deontological foundation that defines their status as individual 
guarantees, the virtues, by contrast, have a typical teleological foundation 
that goes back at least as far as Aristotle.29 As it is well-known, the virtues 
make sense because they are exercised within an ideal of human wellbeing and 
development. Islamic philosophy of the past, as we shall see, accepts entirely 
classical EV not only because they are deeply infused in Greek culture, but 
also because they perceive the affinity between the virtues and the maqasid al-
Shariah: the former are more 'Islam-friendly' than rights are because the 
orienting idea of 'end' or 'purpose' is common both to virtues and to maqasid. 
Once the ideas of virtues and maqasid are discussed, we need to make clear 
what is left in terms of rights: their pervasiveness in contemporary society is 
such that no ethical approach can neglect them entirely. 
 
At this point I need, first, to introduce the concept of maqasid al-Shariah and 
the way it has developed through time; second, I want to stress how the 
interpretation of maqasid is grounded on ijtihad as personal reasoning that 
follows the teaching of Qur'an and Sunnah; finally, I will follow Tariq 
Ramadan's proposal to interpret extensively the idea of maqasid al-Shariah. 
What derives from this reading, I shall maintain, is a view centered on human 
wellbeing and development that overlaps with the gist of the virtues and 
identifies a legitimate ground for transcultural consent. 
 
The maqasid approach to Islam, as it is defined by some commentators,30 is 
taken by many contemporary political parties in Muslim countries as a 
potential for reforming Islamic laws in areas where changes are widely 
demanded, such as, for example, the status of women.31 The question is 
                                                 
29 However the literature is not unanimous: for a review of deontological and 
teleological foundations of virtue ethics see: G Trianosky, 'What Is Virtue Ethics 
All About?'(1990) 27(4) American Phil Quart. 335. 
30 See H Rane,'The Relevance of a Maqasid Approach for Political Islam Post Arab 
Revolution'(2012-3) 28 J.L. And Relig. 489. 
31 However, it should not be forgotten that there is still a large gap between inspiring 
ideals such as maqasid al-Shariah and the practices of violence and extremism that are 
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whether there is enough room in the concept of maqasid for this extensive 
interpretation. It was developed by the twelfth century theologian Al-
Ghazali by reference to five fundamental objectives of the Islamic law: life, 
religion, property, progeny and intellect. In the 16th century Ibn Taymiyyah 
and others developed a more open-ended list of values, understanding 
maqasid in terms of promoting benefit and preventing harm.32 The new list 
included fulfillment of contracts, preservation of kinship ties, honoring the 
rights of one's neighbours, sincerity, trustworthiness and moral purity. 
 
After many centuries and dramatic changes in the conditions of life of 
Muslims, many authors have tried to develop an approach to Islam relevant 
to the operations of the state and society. Ibn Ashur, for example, discusses 
the preservation of the family system, freedom of belief, orderliness, civility, 
human rights, freedom and equality.33 Other recent works, such as Jasser 
Auda's, offer interpretations of the evolution of maqasid from pre-modern to 
modern times. The old concepts have now evolved into family care, pursuit 
of scientific knowledge, upholding human rights and dignity, freedom of 
belief, and economic development.34 
 
It is to be emphasized how the thrust of the concept lends itself to an 
evolution in the Shariah interpretation that is centered on public interest and 
wellbeing (maslaha), rejecting literal readings of sacred texts and giving 
priority to the spirit of the message of Qur'an and Prophetic traditions.35 
Rather, it is well-founded to say that the evolutive interpretation of maqasid 
can be taken as an essential form of ijtihad, independent reasoning. 
 
                                                 
so frequent in Islamic countries. See M Bohlander, 'Political Islam and Non-Muslim 
Religions: A Lesson from Lessing for the Arab Transition, Islam and Christian-
Muslim Relations', (2014) 25(1), 27-47.  
32 See Mohammad Hashim Kamali, An Introduction to Shariah (Ibniah 2006), pp 116-8. 
33 See Muhammad Al-Tahir Ibn Ashur, Treatise on Mawasid al Shariah (Int.l Inst. 
Islamic Thought 2006), pp 142-60, 233-63. 
34 See Jasser Auda, Maqasid Al-Shariah as Philosophy of Islamic Law: A System Approach, 
(Int.l Inst. Islamic Thought 2008). According to Auda – and Ramadan – as we shall 
see, the maqasid lend themselves to an evolutionary interpretation that incorporate 
the many of the contents protected by human rights. 
35 See Kamali (fn 32), pp 128-30. 
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The concept of ijtihad is the second point I want to emphasize. I take it as a 
central aspect in the ethical approach I am trying to sketch here. Addressing 
ijtihad requires a shift of focus toward the area of interpretation, meaning 
both legal interpretation and interpretation of sacred texts. As it is well-
known, Western hermeneutics was born in the first place from the exercise 
of interpretation of Christian sacred texts, such as the Bible.36 Similarly, with 
the Islamic faith we find debate among different approaches to 
interpretation. While literalism claims that knowledge of the Shariah can 
never go beyond what is explicitly documented in the sources, other 
commentators rely on ijtihad as the principal instrument of maintaining 
harmony between Revelation and reason in the Shariah.37 The theory of the 
ijtihad has received contributions from scholars such as Al-Ghazali, Al-Amidi 
and Al-Shirazi. Al-Amidi defined ijtihad as 'the total expenditure of effort in 
the search for an opinion as to any legal rule in such a manner that the 
individual senses (within himself) an inability to expend further effort.'38 
Other important secondary sources of Islamic law are said to represent 
diffrerent forms of ijtihad: consensus of opinion (ijma), analogy (qiyas), juristic 
preference (istihsan) and consideration of public interest (maslahah). 
 
Then, it is plausible to say that ijtihad expresses a canon of interpretation 
conducive to maqasid al Shariah, to define those broader aims and objectives 
of the law that literalism can only fail to achieve. However, we should note 
that not all variants of literalism work in the same way. So called 'juristic 
induction' works on the aggregate of a number of texts, literally interpreted, 
that point to a meaning that transcends each text individually. The meaning 
derives from the whole and goes beyond the individual texts. It was through 
the process of juristic induction or istiqra that pre-modern jurists such as Al-
Shatili or Al-Ghazali vindicated the maqasid al-Shariah. According to the 
latter, justification has to rely not on any single source but on the cumulative 
                                                 
36 Gadamer, Truth and Method (Crossroad 1988), p 295 ff. 
37 See Mohammad Haskim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Islamic Texts 
Society 1991), p 366. 
38 B Weiss, 'Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory of Ijtihad' (1978) Am. 
J.Comp.L. 26, pp 199-207. 
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strength of proofs that are too many to enumerate.39 Ijtihad, some 
commentators conclude, should include also an effort of 'creative 
imagination' in interpreting new contexts such as those of contemporary HR 
and democracy, but still within the bounds of the Shariah. A 'purposive 
approach' to legal interpretation, based on maslahah (public interest) and on 
the five basic maqasid of Islam, is recommended. This approach would 
preserve the ethical and moral precepts underlying the spirit of the Shariah.40  
 
Finally, my third stage in this quick discussion of the concept of maqasid 
addresses Ramadan's extensive interpretation. I have already noted how 
some scholars have proposed an extensive view of maqasid, multiplying their 
number and thrust. Tariq Ramadan is an innovator who makes, first, a radical 
shift in methodology by grounding Islamic ethics in nature and inclining 
unambiguously toward a theory of natural law.41 He takes the frequent 
invocations of the universe and the natural world in the Qur'an as 'signs' of 
God's creation. They show the dignity of nature as a foundation of values, 
according to the sacred text.42 In Ramadan's proposed 'radical reform' the 
objective is the persuasion of multiple communities – Muslim and non 
Muslim, progressive and conservative alike – that a new and extensive 
understanding of usul al-fiqh is possible. The latter is usually understood as 
the system of methodological principles that 'provides criteria for the correct 
deduction of the rules of fiqh from the sources of Shariah.'43 In these sources 
Ramadan wants to integrate 'the Universe and social and human 
environments into the formulation of the ethical finalities of Islam's 
message.'44 In advocating such integration, Ramadan has the illustrious 
precedent of Al-Ghazali who believed that 'the noblest knowledge is where 
                                                 
39 See quotation and comment in Sherman H Jackson, 'Literalism, Empiricism, and 
Induction: Apprehending and Concretizing Islamic Law's Maqasid Al-Shari'ah in 
the Modern World' (2006) Mich.St.L.Rev., p 1477. 
40 Nazeem MI Goolam, 'Ijtihad and Its Significance for Islamic Legal Interpretation', 
(2006) Mich.St.L.Rev., p 1465 ff. 
41 It is quite likely to argue from these premises – without considering other works by 
Ramadan – that his natural law approach may endorse a language of natural rights in 
tune with his argument from maqasid. 
42 See T Ramadan, Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation (OUP 2009), p 88. 
43 See Mohammad Haskim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (fn 37), p 2. 
44 Ramadan (fn 42), p 5. 
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Reason and Tradition are coupled, where rational opinion and the Shariah are 
in association.'45 
 
Ramadan's metaethical effort to integrate the sciences of the Text 
(Revelation) and the sciences of the Universe is coupled with his wide 
understanding of maqasid. Experts in the Revealed Book and in the Book of 
the Universe, 'each with their own methods and standards of proof, have to 
collaborate, first, on identifying higher ethical principles and objectives and, 
then, on elaborating specific applied ethical norms expressed as maqasid for 
individual areas of human activity.'46 His multidimensional scheme of maqasid 
starts from two co-equal purposes; namely, the protection of religion and the 
protection of welfare. The protection of these two founding pillars requires 
three more fundamental objectives: life, nature and peace. The third level 
introduced by Ramadan consists of the protection and promotion of 13 
further maqasid, such as: dignity, welfare, knowledge, creativity, autonomy, 
development, equality, freedom, justice, fraternity, love, solidarity and 
diversity.47 However, he further argues that the Shariah calls for the 
promotion of other 23 maqasid, related to the inner being, the life of the 
individual or social life. Just by way of example, the list includes education, 
conscience, sincerity, health, subsistence, intelligence, rule of law, 
independence, deliberation, etc.48 This list has a wide thrust that 
encompasses both individual ethics and politics. Ramadan's reformist 
attitude engages with conservative clerics on a vast scale, as Andrew March 
emphasizes in his review. I want to borrow from Ramadan's lists and dwell 
particularly on personal rather than public ethics.49 In what follows, I shall try 
to present an integrated sketch of the relations among maqasid, rights and 
                                                 
45 See Al-Ghazali, Mustafa min Ilm al-Usul (English translation: Mansur Hammad, 
Ahmad Zaki, Doctoral Dissertation (University of Chicago 1987). 
46 A March, 'The Post-Legal Ethics of Tariq Ramadan: Persuasion and Performance, 
in "Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation" – A review of T Ramadan (2010) 
Middle East L. and Governance Journ. 2, p 261. 
47 T Ramadan (fn 42), pp 138-9. 
48 See ibid, p 143. 
49 I take the ethics of virtues discussed in section V as an approach concerned with 
individuals without being individualistic: this is the reason why I prefer to use the 
term 'personal ethics' with regard to the ethics of virtues. 
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virtues: they all hinge on a central idea of human development that may 
represent a potential focus of transcultural consent. 
 
V. FROM MAQASID AL-SHARIAH TO THE VIRTUES 
 
The first point to start with is the ideal of human development that seeks to 
encompass the sense of much of Ramadan's lists. 'Dignity, welfare, 
knowledge, autonomy, education', just to name a few, can be clearly summed 
up in the above mentioned ideal. Those values belong to the ethical spirit of 
the Shariah – as we shall see by inquiring into the work of the great theologian 
of the Islamic tradition Al-Ghazali – and will surely raise less controversy 
than the political and legal values proposed by Ramadan: 'rule of law, 
independence, deliberation, pluralism, evolution, cultures'. I will set aside the 
political discussion that would probably lead us to the well-known anthitesis 
of liberal/non-liberal principles. This discussion, often framed in Rawlsian 
terms, notwithstanding its importance, misses, in my view, part of its ethical 
relevance because it neglects individual ethics. Even some careful liberal 
thinkers recognize that 'rights-based moralities' are impoverished, if they do 
not take into account concepts such as the virtues. As already noted, Raz 
holds that the virtues are among the most important candidates for filling in 
that loss of ethical meaning that we experience, if we rely only on rights.50 
 
In my view, there is an ideal of human development in Ramadan's list that 
also overlaps with many liberal perfectionist positions in the Western debate. 
Although the enlarged list of maqasid presented by Ramadan is explicitly 
drawn from the Shariah, it seems not farfetched to say that at least the values 
concerned with individual ethics encompass a perfectionist programme. 
Political and ethical perfectionism are theoretical positions recently 
advocated by a few authors in the liberal debate, but often criticized by many 
other orthodox liberals.51 At the political level, perfectionism entails an 
effort of the State to promote some kind of conception of the good life of its 
                                                 
50 See J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon Press 1986), pp 196-8. 
51 W Galston, Liberal Purposes (CUP 1991); R Dworkin, 'Foundations of Liberal 
Equality', in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (University of Utah Press 1991); T 
Hurka, Perfectionism, OUP 1993); J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (fn 12); G Sher, Beyond 
Neutrality (CUP 1997); S Wall, Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint (CUP 1998). 
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citizens. At the ethical level, each citizen is committed to improve his/her 
good life according to certain objectively valid criteria. In my view, 
Ramadan's lists amount to an ethical and political perfectionist program and 
it may be very helpful to verify its overlappings with Martha Nussbaum's 
Aristotelian conception, expressed in 'Aristotelian Social Democracy' (ASD) 
and 'Non-Relative Virtues' (NRV).52 While the first essay concerns more the 
political level, the second claims to propose an objectivist conception of 
human ends across societies. From both points of view, HR remain an 
important sphere of protection for human beings but, in Nussbaum's view, 
rights are coherently justified on the grounds of a conception of good human 
functioning. In my view this appears as a much sounder foundation than what 
happens in many contemporary catalogues of HR.  
 
A first important point that Nussbaum stresses in ASD53 is that of calling her 
proposal a 'thick vague conception of the good'. 'Thick' comes in opposition 
to Rawls' 'thin theory of the good': it has to deal not only with all-purpose 
means to good living but also with 'human ends across all areas of human 
life'.54 I believe that this outline, proposed by Nussbaum, but drawn from 
Aristotle's reflections, even if it is somewhat controversial for its universalist 
character, can be subscribed to by people such as Ramadan and other Islamic 
authors, concerned with human welfare, as the Shariah prescribes. The thick 
conception wants to get at an account of human functioning that can be 
shared in diverse societies, but without imposing an objectivist conception of 
the human good which may raise big controversy. In NRV Nussbaum 
proposes a hermeneutical account of what it is to be a human being that is not 
based on any 'metaphysical biology' (as Aristotle is often charged with), but 
on the commonness of myths and stories from many times and places, stories 
explaining to both friends and strangers what it is to be human, rather than 
something else. These stories define many characteristics of the human being 
that make it what it is, rather than another creature: for example, the human 
being, differently from the gods (of the ancient Greeks), lives a mortal life 
                                                 
52 M Nussbaum, 'Non-Relative Virtues', in Midwest Studies in Philosophy Vol. XIII, 
(Notre Dame University Press 1988); M Nussbaum 'Aristotelian Social Democracy' 
in H Richardson, G Mara and R Douglass (eds), Liberalism and the Good (Kegan 1990). 
53 M Nussbaum, 'Aristotelian Social Democracy' (fn 52), p 217. 
54 ibid. 
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and, differently from the Cyclopes, shows sensitivity to the needs of others 
and a sense of commitment and affiliation. 
 
The kind of myths and stories that are told in every society from generation 
to generation represent features of our common humanity that can also be 
plausibly considered shared in Islamic societies. I believe each of us can 
recognize the general features of his/her life in the list presented by 
Nussbaum: mortality, capacity for pleasure and pain, cognitive capabilities of 
perceiving, imagining and thinking, early infant development, practical 
reason, affiliation with other human beings, relatedness to other species and 
nature, humour and play and separateness. Such a list, Nussbaum says, is 
open-ended because some items can be added or subtracted and is also 
evaluative in having already made some choices.55 What is most important to 
us is that from these circumstances Nussbaum derives a list of basic 
capabilities such as being able to live to the end of a complete human life, to 
have good health, to avoid unnecessary and non-useful pain, to use the five 
senses, etc.56 According to Nussbaum's interpretation of Aristotle's ethics, 
this list expresses what counts most for human well-functioning. 
 
Ramadan's list of maqasid appears at one time larger and narrower than 
Nussbaum's list. It is larger insofar as it includes political values, such as the 
rule of law, pluralism, evolution, cultures, religions and memories. Some of 
them attain the organization of political institutions, others emphasize the 
necessary plurality of certain concepts (e.g. 'religions'). Ramadan's list is also 
narrower, however, insofar as it covers things such as physical integrity, 
health, subsistence, intelligence, progeny but forgets, for example, the 
capability to form a conception of the good or to live with concern for nature. 
However, these slight differences should not hide the fact that the purposes 
(maqasid) included in the Shariah are aimed at public interest and human 
welfare. With regard to human development, Nussbaum's list seems only to 
offer a more complete and coherent set of purposes, articulated as 
capabilities. Insofar as Ramadan wants to persuade traditional religious 
scholars in Islam he should better consider Nussbaum's list of capabilities 
                                                 
55 ibid, p 224. 
56 ibid, p 225. 
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grounded in a plausible conception of the human being. Although he may 
object that his own lists of maqasid traced in the Shariah range also at a 
political level, Ramadan may be willing to admit that his move to ground 
Islamic ethics in nature nicely meets a list of capabilities grounded in a 
conception of the human being. 
 
Now, it is time to go back to the EV that I introduced as the 'innovative' 
feature of my approach to Islamic ethics. Of course, the long tradition of EV, 
covering both Western and Islamic ethics, gives an almost paradoxical 
flavour to the idea that EV be innovative in Islamic ethics. I can comment 
that, on the one hand, most Muslim authors seem to have lost track of the 
secular tradition of EV in their culture, probably as a consequence of the 
pervasiveness of Western 'rights discourse'. On the other hand, a slight 
element of innovation consists in using Nussbaum's Aristotelian approach to 
capabilities and virtues to find common ground with Islamic ethics. On these 
presuppositions I will proceed, first, by giving a quick summary of 
Nussbaum's proposal concerning 'non-relative virtues' and, second, by 
offering, to some extent, a detailed account of the views of the major classical 
Islamic philosophers on the virtues. 
 
First, we should consider Nussbaum's proposal with regard to non-relative 
virtues.57 Following Aristotle, Nussbaum lists a number of spheres of 
experience the most important of which are: fear of important damages, 
especially death, bodily appetites and their pleasures, distribution of limited 
resources, management of one's personal property where others are 
concerned, attitudes to slights and damages; association and living together, 
and others.58 All these spheres define necessary circumstances of our human 
life and we would generally recognize a life lacking in one of these as defective, 
as missing something specifically human. To give a couple of examples: we 
could hardly recognize the life of an immortal being as a human life (literary 
cases of this kind strike us just because they fuel extraordinary possibilities), 
while social bonds, although only empirically founded, seem to constitute a 
                                                 
57 She has often come back to the issue of EV, although her non-relative proposal 
remains the one formulated in NRV. See also her 'Virtue Ethics: A Misleading 
Category'(1999) 3 The Journal of Ethics 1989. 
58 Nussbaum, 'Non-relative Virtues' (fn 52), p 35. 
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part of a specifically human life, whatever theoretical approach we want to 
choose. 
 
There is a general and elastic correspondence between these spheres and the 
list of virtues sketched by Nussbaum.59 Courage seems in play when mortality 
is involved, temperance for bodily appetites and their pleasures, justice for 
the distribution of scarce resources, generosity in dealing with one's own 
property, friendliness in one's social bonds, etc. Of course, there are virtues 
such as magnanimity which, taken as attitudes and actions regarding one's 
own worth, seem culture-bound to ancient Greece, and we could think of 
others, such as the attitude to our natural environment, which are 'progress-
bound' and are still nameless in our culture. 
 
By and large, however, the list of basic spheres and corresponding virtues is 
justified by their acceptance independently of differences in time and place. 
We can still recognize what is good and bad in literary cases from the past or 
from very foreign cultures because their virtues and vices still correspond to 
our 'thin' descriptions. Thin descriptions of what courage or justice are need 
to be filled in accordance to specific circumstances of place and time, as we 
already mentioned, but holding that the right response is courage rather than 
cowardice or rashness is inescapable from the human condition. When fear 
of severe harm to our body and even death are concerned, we admire the 
courageous person rather than the coward or the rash one. There is no 
personal intuition here to identify what is virtue and what is vice, but a large 
convergence of shared opinions through time and space.60 
 
VI. THE ROLE OF REASON IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION 
 
In order to asses the Islamic position on EV and verify the possibilities of 
finding a common ground with the capabilities approach proposed by 
Nussbaum, we need to travel a certain distance both theoretically and 
                                                 
59 ibid, pp 35-6.  
60 It is worth-mentioning here that the idea of virtue has a higher degree of universality 
than the competing conception of 'fundamental rights' which is so often on the 
banners now. 
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historically. I believe we should take our inquiry back to the first centuries of 
Islamic thought because in that period we find a well-known divide whose 
exploration can give precious hints for a correct understanding of the present 
situation. 
 
I shall try to proceed by showing how a sharp distinction between the two 
schools of thought which struggled for supremacy in the Islamic field from 
the eighth to the eleventh century A.D., the Mu'tazalite and the Ash'arite 
schools of theology, would not give the correct sense of the nuances of 
thought that differentiated early Islamic schools. The debate rotates around 
the relationship between Sharia and reason: it is such an important issue that 
it influences the pre-modern and the modern period alike. Muslims confront 
the role, scope and authority of reason with a religious tradition in which the 
Qu'ran refers God's word, as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad.61 In 
inquiring into the possible roles of reason in Islamic ethics and law, I want to 
depart from the major opposition between the Mu'tazilite and the Ash'arite 
school. However, I acknowledge the necessity of accounting for more 
nuanced distinctions concerning the ontological authority of reason in Sharia 
and, also, concerning the extent to which 'reasoned deliberation about the 
good and the bad can assume sufficient normative authority to result in 
Sharia's norms that reflect what God desires or wills.' 
 
I want to start by describing a few basic aspects which characterize the 
Mu'tazilite, rationalist position. Historically this position developed its set 
of views earlier than the traditionalist, Ash'arite school. The latter can be said 
to have developed as a reaction against rationalist views. The ethical tenets 
that sum up into the Mu'tazalite ideal seem to encourage in the human beings 
a measure of freedom and power to act in opposition to the faith in a divine 
omnipotence crushing human free will.62 
 
                                                 
61 See A Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p 
11. 
62 For my reconstruction of the Mu'tazalite views I am largely in debt to G F Hourani, 
'Divine Justice and Human Reason in Mu'tazalite Ethical Theology' in R G 
Hovannisian (ed), Ethics in Islam, (Undena Publ 1985), pp 73-83. 
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The Mu'tazalite method of research can be characterized as a method of 
kalam, dialectic within theology. In other words, they dealt with a selective 
interpretation of the Qu'ran which takes certain principles as fundamental 
and derives extensive inferences. It seems particularly relevant to the 
Mu'tazili kalam dealing with the notion of justice. They do not take justice to 
depend on God's will but, rather, believe that God always acts in ways 
consistent with justice. This has a few other implications, but now it is worth 
emphasizing that, according to the Mu'tazili's view, even God's acts can be 
measured against justice. 
 
The logically prior tenet from which most of the Mu'talizi reflection started 
is the metaethical thesis according to which ethical attributes such as 'just', 
'obligatory', 'good' and 'evil' have an objective existence. The 'definitions of 
these objective terms were worked out in terms of what deserves to be 
approved, tolerated or disapproved.'63 What is approved or disapproved is 
independent of God's will and cannot be reduced to what is commanded, 
permitted or forbidden by God. However, even though it is logically possible 
for God to be unjust, it is inadmissible on rational and moral grounds, as some 
Mu'tazilites held. 
 
The second tenet of the rationalist school that deserves attention is that 
human beings have power to act independently of the divine will. Rewarding 
and punishing, the Mu'tazilites argue, would only make sense, if men had a 
chance of being just or unjust on their own responsibility. With regard to 
rational and religious grounds to establish the principle of human 
responsibility, on the one hand the Qu'ran states several times that God does 
not impose on anyone duties beyond his power (notwithstanding the fact that 
other passages state the principles of predestination). On the other hand, on 
rational grounds the Mu'tazilites argued that capacity is a condition of 
obligation, as it is declared also by Sharia law. Thus, the power to choose 
freely is a precondition for any attribution of responsibility. 
 
The third and basic principle put forward by the rationalist school is 
epistemological: they hold that 'human beings also have the power to know 
                                                 
63 See Hourani (fn 63), p 75. 
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objective ethical truths and make ethical judgments to some extent by direct 
thought or reason.'64 The objective existence of terms such as 'justice, 
obligation and evil' entails that man can have knowledge of these meanings. 
An important consequence of this position is that anyone can know the main 
obligations and prohibitions of life by his reason: not only Sharia lawyers can 
give answers on what obligations we have. However, the doctrine of rational 
ethical knowledge does not entail that we can know all our obligations by 
natural reason because this has to be supplemented by revelation on details. 
Revelation is not made useless by reason, according to the Mu'tazilites 
because it still preserves the important function to motivate right conduct 
and thought. 
 
The account I have offered of the metaethical frame of the Mu'tazilite 
position describes views that are familiar to Western thought insofar as they 
are the direct legacy of Greek ethics. However, over time this account has 
been overwhelmed by the traditionalist ethical view: the Ash'arite school 
which reacted to the rationalism of Mu'tazilites. Ash'arite theology can be 
summarized under a few principles which are in direct opposition to the three 
Mu'tazili tenets we have just identified. On the first metaethical position, in 
contrast with rationalist objectivism of values, the Ash'arite held 'that values 
are not just "objectively" present in human actions and readily available to 
reason, but that they are the result of the divine will.'65 This position is a kind 
of theistic subjectivism centered on the divine will that cannot be known by 
reason, but only approached through sources such as the divine scripture and 
prophetic saying. Ash'arite theology establishes the superiority of 'tradition' 
or 'revelation' over reason not per se, but because tradition and revelation lead 
to faith and its unity in the fellowship of believers, the umma. 
 
A second important point of dispute had to do with the second tenet of the 
Mu'tazilite school: the Ash'arites wanted to deny that human beings have 
power to act independently of God's will. The central term for them was kasb 
or 'acquisition'. The idea is that man 'acquires the responsibility of his acts, 
even though, according to the Ash'ari, man's power to perform his acts is not 
                                                 
64 ibid, p 74. 
65 S Stelzer, 'Ethics' in T Winters (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic 
Theology (CUP 2008), p 166. 
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his own.'66 They held that it is God to set in motion the power of choice in 
men and, thus, 'creates' man's behaviour. In this doctrine, there is not much 
room left for the attribution of responsibility to human beings. The idea of 
acquisition makes little progress in terms of free choice: it entails 
simultaneity of man's power and will with God's creation of the act, but man 
is no more than a receptacle for it. However, the doctrine of secondary causes 
made some steps in the direction of distinguishing between the agent and the 
Creator: when the former receives an attribute or an act, 'its qualification 
relates to that receptacle, not to any other.'67 
 
It is worth-emphasizing that about three centuries after the dispute between 
the two Islamic schools in the Christian West Aquinas tried to devise a 
theory of the virtues which went beyond the Augustinian position that virtue 
is a gift of God. Augustine did not ascribe any important role to human effort 
because in his view the infused virtues are produced in us 'without us' and 
prepare the way to receive the cardinal virtues from God. Aquinas left more 
room to human effort through the doctrine of 'acquired virtues'. These direct 
a person's action with regard to his highest good in the worldly life, but they 
also prepare the person to receive its 'infused' counterpart, realizing in this 
way a harmonious transition.68  
 
I believe Aquinas's move has been crucial toward the affirmation of freedom 
of choice in the Western philosophy, while the Mu'tazilites were not given 
the same opportunity because of their suppression through the decrees of the 
caliph Qadir in 1017 and 1041. Probably most of the ulama showed hostility 
toward the Mu'tazili rationalistic methodology of inquiry into questions of 
law and ethics. The majority of the Islamic clergy, well-known on the positive 
sources of Qu'ran and hadith, felt it much easier and uncontroversial to tackle 
theological questions on the grounds of those sources rather than recurring 
to the controversial and difficult rationalistic methodology. 
 
                                                 
66 G Makdisi, 'Ethics in Islamic Traditionalist Doctrine', in R G Hovannisian (ed), 
Ethics in Islam (fn 63), p 52. 
67 ibid, p 54. 
68 See J Inglis, 'Aquinas's Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues', (1999) 27 Journal 
of Religious Ethics 11, pp 3-27. 
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The general thrust of Ash'arite theology is shown clearly also by their 
rejection of the third Mu'tazili tenet: they denied that human beings have the 
power to know objective truths and make ethical judgments to some extent 
by reason. The traditionalist school held that Islamic theology had to 
concentrate on God's commands and prohibitions in order to know what is 
good to do. If it is God who indicates what is good and what is evil, we can 
also derive ethical obligations from these indications. It is all in the 
scriptures, according to the traditionalists: there is no need of rational 
reflection. However, a centuries long debate between the schools has 
produced a more nuanced understanding of the determination of good and 
evil. Philosophical theology – kalam  – and juridical theology – usul al fiqh – 
confront each other on the problem of the legitimacy of ethical knowledge. 
What is at stake is not so much a radical alternative between reason and 
revelation, but whether the determination of knowledge is 'made by reason 
unaided or by reason aided by the data of revelation.'69 
 
VII. HARD AND SOFT NATURAL LAW IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION 
 
The account I have just offered of the Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite views shows 
a sharp contrast that may be useful for the reader who wants to grasp a basic 
sketch. However, as it often happens, real historical positions present a much 
more nuanced picture of the relations between Sharia and reason. Anver 
Emon offers a useful key of understanding by centering his discussion on 
natural law jurisprudence. He says that 'the question of whether human moral 
enquiry into the good (husu) and the bad (qubh) can be an authoritative basis 
for assessing a rule of law consonant with the divine will when source texts are 
silent' remains an open question for us.70 
 
He distinguishes two models of natural law theory, called Hard Natural Law 
and Soft Natural Law. The first relied on the theological presumption that 
God only does what is good: God wants X because X is good. In short, the 
argument is that God is only just and created the world to benefit humanity. 
We can discern these benefits through the use of our reason and develop 
norms of behaviour based on the divine will. The central point of this view 
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that marks the difference from the crude Mu'tazilite position I have referred 
to earlier is that 'hard naturalists fused the value arising from God's justice 
and will with the facts of a natural order to invest nature with both objectivity 
and value.'71 From the fusion of fact and value we can understand how hard 
naturalists thought that by observing the natural world they could reason 
about the good and the bad and transform empirical assessments into 
normative ones. 
 
By contrast, it is no surprise that the voluntarist jurists that can be gathered 
under the label of Soft Natural Law sided with the Ash'arite in rejecting the 
theology of Hard Natural Law as potentially undermining God's 
omnipotence: God's will cannot be limited by only doing the good as 
discovered by human reason. So, how to deal with those cases in which no 
source text addresses the issue? Is there any other way out than suspending 
judgment? The crucial move of Soft Natural Law theories is that of balancing 
nature as a benefitting source with God's grace. The argument of grace both 
allows for the fusion of fact and value in nature – natural reason remains 
authoritative – and preserves a theological commitment to God's 
omnipotence.72 We human beings can rely upon God's creation of nature, 
because he did it out of grace, but He is not limited in His power to alter His 
creation at any time. 
 
What is most important for our purposes in this paper is that Soft Natural 
Law theories designed models of practical reasoning centered around 
concepts such as maslaha (perceived general good that speaks to the 
perfection of the polity) and maqasid al-Sharia (the five fundamental values of 
life, lineage, property, mind and religion). However, Soft Naturalists 
ironically did not employ those concepts to answer the challenge of 
modernity, as some contemporary reformers do (as referred in section 4). 
Rather, a maslaha argument was called on by some of these jurists to justify a 
rule of law in the absence of a source-text. Maqasid and maslaha were taken as 
devices to limit the operation of reason in the law. If contemporary reformers 
                                                 
71 ibid, p 26. He refers to authors such as al-Jassas, Qadi Abd al-Jabbar and Abu al-
Husayn al-Basri. 
72 ibid, p 32. 
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can look at them as sources of progress, this may be taken as a sign of 
proximity between reasoned deliberation and God's grace. 
 
The first important author who shows clearly all the main tenets of soft 
natural law is Al-Ghazali whose theory shows both the fusion of fact and value 
and the element of divine grace that preserves God's voluntaristic 
omnipotence. The latter is at the origin of all our reasoning through the 
jurisprudence of maslaha: this is reliable because we as humans can count on 
what results from God's gracious creation. Al-Ghazali offers the clearest 
example of a connection between maslaha and maqasid al-Sharia and the kind 
of reasoning that can derive from them. Maqasid are the basic aims of Sharia 
but are not derived from scriptural source-texts: they are, rather, intuitively 
known.73 The maqasid provide the values to which any maslaha must pose a 
nexus to contribute to the development of particular rules of law. The nexus 
between the maslaha and a particular rule is identified by Al-Ghazali as 
munasaba: it is a rationale that cannot be rejected unless by showing its 
illegitimacy. A typical classical example is developed by Al-Ghazali's 
reasoning from the prohibition on wine consumption. He inferred from the 
prohibition that its munasaba or rationale had to do with wine's intoxicating 
effect and the necessity of protecting the integrity of the mind (one of the 
maqasid).74 
 
These few hints may give the impression that Al-Ghazali spouses entirely the 
position dubbed as Soft Natural Law and its understanding of reason. 
However, we would be misled by not paying attention to the different periods 
of Al-Ghazali's life. His most clearly ethical work, the Ihya' Ulum al-Din, 
dates to his mature age, his Sufi period. This work requires more attention 
with regard to the ethics of virtues which offers but a few hints that may be 
put forward with regard to the role of reason. 
 
                                                 
73 In Ibrahim Muhammad Ramadan (ed), al-Mustafa min 'Ilm al-Usul, (Beirut: Dar al-
Arqam, I), pp 636-37 al-Ghazali illustrates the five values of maqasid by referring to 
scriptural examples. 
74 See Al-Ghazali, Shifa al-Ghalil, Muhammad al-Kubaysi (ed) (Baghdad: Ra'asa Diwan 
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With regard to knowledge of good and evil, reason can help only by the 
understanding of what the prophets communicate to us, but insofar as the 
truth is conveyed to us through revelation we do not need reason at a higher 
level. We can walk along the way of the prophets only through revelation.75 
According to one view, the mystical element remains dominant within Al-
Ghazali's ethical theory, notwithstanding the presence of philosophical and 
religious elements. By contrast, according to another view, the conjunction 
of reason and revelation allows the achievement of moral perfection or 
moderation.76 
 
However, if we look at previous works such as al-Mustasfa and Shifa al-Ghalil 
there is plenty of room to identify a sounder basis for practical reasoning in 
al-Ghazali. He wants to legitimize 'silent maslaha' as authority to justify 
Sharia rules only when it poses the strongest nexus to the basic values. This 
nexus has to be carefully scrutinized and shown to serve necessary interests 
for the benefit and perfection of society at large.77 Al-Ghazali employs, 
among others, the example of Muslims used as human shields by unbelievers 
waging war. The question is whether to strike, killing innocent Muslims, or 
refrain from striking, letting the unbelievers conquer the land of Islam. In the 
                                                 
75 See M A Quasem, The Ethics of Al-Ghazali (Selangor Malaysia 1975), p 28. 
76 See Fakhry Ethical Theories in Islam (Brill 1991), p 199. It is interesting to notice that 
the reception of the Ihya in the centuries that followed was more than controversial, 
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otherworldly sciences over the worldly ones, leaving little role to fiqh (jurisprudence) 
and kalam (theology). He advocated Sufism among the religious sciences as the one 
that may lead to certainty but, notwithstanding the success of Al-Ghazali's book in 
later centuries, the radical religious implications were gradually lost sight of. The 
success of the Ihya in the Islamic West (the Maghribi Sufi movement) depended on 
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77 See al-Mustasfa 1, p 640. 
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second case, he argues, they will kill all the Muslims and also the prisoners 
used as shields. Al-Ghazali thinks that the second option poses a tighter 
nexus to the aim of the law which is to reduce killing and, in more general 
terms, to contribute to the perfection of society.78 This kind of reasoning also 
seems quite compatible with contemporary utilitarian-like styles of 
reasoning and certainly shows an allegiance to reason that may have been 
reduced in later works. 
 
It is important to emphasize that al-Ghazali's line of understanding of Sharia 
found other influential followers in later centuries, such as Fakr al Din al-
Razi. He is prominent among those who proposed a reasoned deliberation 
based on the use of maslaha where Sharia is silent. In his major work, al-
Mahsul, al-Razi argued that God legislates rules for the benefit (maslaha) of 
the people: when a connection between rules and maslaha can be identified, 
we have an acceptable justification even if Sharia is silent. However, al-Razi 
shows his legal capacities in not being content of proposing the ontological 
authority of natural reason through the concept of maslaha. Similarly to al-
Ghazali, he is concerned with identifying the ratio legis of a rule: he uses the 
concept of munasib to identify the rational nexus between a given rule and the 
five basic goals of the law or maqasid.79 A final, but eloquent appeal to reason 
may be found in the proposed hierarchical connection between maslaha and 
the basic aims of the law: it is only the first, darura or necessary interest (not 
a simple need or a perfectionist value) that can justify the creation or extension 
of the law.80 
 
Al-Razi's theoretical moves that I have quickly referred to show, as Emon 
holds, his intention to fuse fact and value in nature, similarly to Hard 
Naturalism. But, as in the case of al-Ghazali, he wants to reject the view that 
there is a permanent quality of the natural order that obligates God to do good. 
So, we see here the element of divine grace to come back to grant God's 
omnipotence. However, this element does not undermine our reasonable 
reliance on the regularity of nature and the benefits it presents.81 
                                                 
78 See Emon (fn 61), pp 139-40. 
79 See al-Razi, al-Mahsul, 5, p 160.; see also Emon (fn 61), p 154 ff. 
80 See al-Razi, al-Mahsul, 6, p 163. 
81 See Emon (fn 61), p 159.  
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The red thread offered by the Soft Natural Law framework gives us a clear 
sense of how the Islamic landscape of the Middle Ages was far less black and 
white – Mu'tazilite v. Ash'arite – than what it might appear at a first look. 
Most acute writers on the voluntarist side such as al-Ghazali and al-Razi did 
not neglect at all the role of rational inquiry in extending the application of 
the Sharia. Something more and particularly noteworthy can be said with 
regard to other two famous names militating respectively in the philosophical 
and in the theological camp. In the philosophical camp, Miskawayh is 
noteworthy on the issue of reason: he holds that the intellectual perfection of 
wisdom can and should be overcome in a higher spiritual realm in which man 
can receive the illumination of the divine light. In this way man can partake 
of the divine perfection, overcoming all worldly desires and anxieties.82 
Miskawayh tends to locate the idea of happiness in an intellectual, spiritual 
and divine realm where it cannot be marred by terrestrial or bodily events. 
The connection with the divine will can be described in 'mystical' terms 
which seem to draw away from the Aristotelian framework of thought, 
notwithstanding Miskawayh's confidence that it can be fitted into the latter's 
scheme. 
 
In turn, in the theological camp we find a thinker usually considered as an 
icon of extremist Islamism, Ibn Taymiyya whose project, once carefully 
assessed, can be described as an attempt to draw a sort of 'via media', carrying 
forward a message of moderation.83 It should be emphasized that Ibn 
Taymiyya, notwithstanding his popular perception as a prominent religious 
figure throughout Islamic history, 'was regarded with an attitude of 
"fluctuating scepticism" within the Damascene Hanbalite circles.84 Sophia 
Vasalou emphasizes how the explicit theme of Ibn Taymiyya's most relevant 
works was that of identifying dialectically a balance between opposing 
extremes, elements of truth contained in different views aiming at the final 
claim of harmony between reason and revelation. 
                                                 
82 See Miskawayh, Tahdhib al Akhlaq (English translation by C K Zurayk, The 
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It would be senseless to try to sketch here all the main lines of reflection put 
forward by Ibn Taymiyya in his huge and non-systematic production. It may 
be helpful to recall that most of the questions we are concerned with in 
Taymiyya's work can be grasped under the rubric of al-Tahsin wa'l-taqbih or 
'the determination of good and bad' or 'right and wrong'. With regard to his 
focal issue, Ibn Taymiyya states clearly his proposal of drawing a via media 
that encompasses both the Mu'tazilite position, according to which an act 
contains benefit or harm and it would do so even if the Law did not report it, 
and an Ash'arite position, according to which the Lawgiver commands 
something that becomes good and forbids something that becomes bad. He 
finally allows for a third category of acts that the Lawgiver commands only to 
put his servants to test.85 
 
What seems most characterizing of Ibn Taymiyya's views for our purposes is 
his ontology of value that takes distance from the Ash'arite's rejection of 
reason: he openly embraces the objectivity of values, though leaving the door 
open to other categories of acts, as we have just seen.86 With his doctrine of 
God's determination of human acts Ibn Taymiyya wants to re-balance the 
conflict between God's justice and God's power that had been settled by the 
Mu'tazilite in favour of the former. However, the place where we really find 
a declaration of his objectivism of values is where he says that 'an act contains 
benefit of harm (maslaha as-mafsada) even if the Law had not come to report 
that.'87 Notwithstanding the importance of deontological considerations, 
Vasalou states clearly that 'it is the notion of utility, […] that appears to carry 
moral ultimacy within Ibn Taymiyya's scheme.'88 He states, similarly to 
Western utilitarians, that 'every living being strives for what brings it 
enjoyment and pleasure.'89 Elsewhere we find that there are things beneficial 
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and agreeable to human beings and things contrary and harmful: the first give 
them pleasure, the second pain.90 Often we find, Sophia Vasalou observes, 
Ibn Taymiyya gliding from psychological descriptions to more normative 
tones, from stating that 'every living being strives for what brings it 
enjoyment and pleasure' to 'living beings should attain what benefits them 
and gives them pleasure.'91 What is most striking in Ibn Taymiyya's 
presentation of ethical issues is the union of two different claims: first, an 
objective claim about benefit as an ethical value and, second, an ascription of 
subjective emotive states according to which we experience love for those 
who show justice, knowledge, beneficence, etc. and desire to praise them and 
wish them well.92 This approach, Vasalou notes, reminds us of Hume's 
sentimentalist analysis of moral notions by which he takes an action or 
character to be vicious or virtuous, if we have sentiments of blame or praise 
'from the constitution of our nature'.93 
 
In concluding my non-systematic remarks on the role of reason in the Islamic 
tradition, I want to emphasise the extent to which reasoned deliberation 
about the good and the bad results is important in determining the 
interpretation of Sharia. The weight and influence of Middle Ages thinkers 
on the Islamic tradition is paired and renewed by those contemporary 
Muslim thinkers, such as Muhammad Fadel, who try to find elements of 
compatibility between John Rawls' liberal scheme of public reason and the 
tradition of rational inquiry that Fadel retrieves in Islamic theology and law 
(cf section 1).94 
 
It is important to remember how Fadel is not alone in proposing a liberal, 
Rawlsian scheme as a solution able to encompass and find room for Islamic 
values. Andrew March is a liberal, non-Muslim political theorist who 
proposes a 'compatibility view', arguing that Islam may be interpreted as a 
strong moral commitment, a 'comprehensive doctrine' in Rawls' terms, that 
                                                 
90 See Ibn Taymiyya, Majmu Fatawa, (fn 8), pp 308-9. 
91 See Vasalou (fn 85), p 35. 
92 See Ibn Taymiyya, ar-Radd 'ala al-Mantiqiyyin, p 423. 
93 Vasalou (fn 85), p 38. 
94 See M Fadel, 'The True, the Good and the Reasonable: the Theological and Ethical 
Roots of Public Reason in Islamic Law (fn 4). 
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can be shown at least not in conflict with those political values that are 
specified by a liberal-democratic conception of justice.95 March takes his 
search for an overlapping consensus as an exercise in 'comparative ethics', 
meaning liberalism, on the one hand, and Islamic ethics, on the other, 
understood as the tradition of Islamic law, including Qur'anic exegesis 
(tafsir), hadith, commentary, jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) and substantive legal-
ethical rulings (furn' al-fiqh).96 March aims at a point of equilibrium that 
requires the least amount of revision of traditional Islamic commitments in 
order to require the least amount of departure from traditional and widely 
held beliefs.97 
 
I would only comment on March's and Fadel's attempts that in order to 
maximize their possibilities of success they should consider whether to 
enlarge Rawls' scheme of overlapping consensus so that also a selection of the 
classical virtues that receive allegiance from Islamic and Western quarters 
alike can be included.98 A stronger foundation of values would be better 
                                                 
95 See A March, Islam and Liberal Citizenship: The Search for an Overlapping 
Consensus (OUP 2009), pp 12-3. 
96 ibid, p 14. 
97 ibid, p 14. 
98 The push to reform Islam from the inside is not peculiar to the contemporary 
authors I have just presented – and to many others who work in the same direction 
in our days. We would not have a clear picture of present day situation without 
recalling the modernist Islamic movement that emerged in many Islamic countries 
between the 19th and the 20th century. People such as Rashid Rida (Lebanon), Rafi' 
al-Tahtawi (Egypt) and Khayr al-Din (Tunisia) have strongly supported the argument 
for freedom of expression. First, they realized the degree to which Islamic countries 
fared backward with regard to European civilization and progress and recognized 
that progress in the governance of mankind relied primarily on respect for personal 
and political rights (See Khayr al-Din, The Surest Path, in Kurzman, Modernist Islam 
1840-1940 (OUP 2002), p 40 ff.). Some of them – in particular Rida – remarked that 
there is continuity between social progress and religious evolution because a hadith 
says that 'God sends to nation at the beginning of every century someone to renew 
its religion.' (Kurzman, p 6) Second, scholars belonging to the modernist movement 
had first to argue against aqlid – following established scholars – in order to defend 
their right to make innovative arguments. For example, Tahtawi and Rida – along 
many others – appealed to ijtihad as rational interpretation but so long as it 
supported the principles of religion (see Kurzman, p 13). Third and last, with regard 
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received in my view by Muslims who traditionally have in their cultural 
background concepts such as maqasid and maslaha that make reference to 
valuable purposes to realize in a Muslim community. The work ahead of 
political theorists would be, according to this program, that of defining a 
strong common ground in which virtues, maqasid, and maslaha could find their 
place and compatibility with classical liberal principles. 
 
VIII. THE VIRTUES IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION: A SHORT 
ACCOUNT 
 
Following this sketchy description of the role of reason in different streams 
of Islamic ethical theory, we should now approach the core interest of our 
inquiry: the virtues. In parallel with the previous step, I want to start my 
account with those Islamic authors such as Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina and Ibn 
Rushd who show most clearly the Greek legacy. For each of these 
philosophers, I want to focus in detail upon a few points which show very 
clearly their connection with Aristotle's and Plato's EV. 
 
First, we should notice how Al-Farabi distinguished between moral and 
intellectual virtues, following a well-established tradition that gives a special 
place to practical wisdom among those belonging to the latter category. Its 
place depends on its capacity of determining the right kind of action in each 
kind of situation. Similarly to the Western tradition, the person of practical 
wisdom is designated as 'reasonable'. 
 
Second, among the moral virtues a special mention is reserved to friendship 
which is treated along Aristotelian lines, but with some religious element 
which helps to design what virtuous men hold in common. According to Al-
                                                 
to the direction of the progress inspired by the European model Khayr al-Din notes 
that Muslims should not ignore values that are correct and come from other cultures, 
but that were formerly possessed by Muslims (often these writers emphasize how 
Europeans have drawn from Islamic countries knowledge that they have later 
developed (see Kurzman, pp 17-8). Among the new conquests of the European 
culture to be implemented by Islamic countries Tahtawi counted and praised 
'constitutionalism' founded on equality, taken as sharing the same laws and being 
equal before the state: a view that also the sacred text dictates (see Kurzman, p 20). 
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Farabi, they have to represent a community of belief or action, focused on 
beliefs regarding God, spiritual entities, the origin of the world. These 
common beliefs, in turn, make possible a community of virtue and mutual 
advantage. 
 
In Ibn Sina's short tract on ethics (Fi 'Ibn-al-Akhlaq) we find more attention 
being dedicated to single classical virtues, such as temperance, justice and 
wisdom. They correspond to the three powers of the soul: the concupiscent, 
the irascible and the rational respectively. Each of the general virtues has 
subdivisions which specify aspects of temperance, courage and wisdom 
according to the plurality of ways in which they can be manifested in practical 
life. It is also worth mentioning that Ibn Sina shows more clearly than Al 
Farabi and Ibn Rushd the influence of Islamic religion on his view of the 
virtuous man and his performing religious duties. In his view, the religious 
man of virtue 'will be assisted by God to achieve success in whatever he 
undertakes.'99 
 
In Ibn Rushd (Averroes) we find, with regard to the virtues, an approach 
clearly deriving from the Platonic division of the soul into three parts 
corresponding to three parts of the city. Wisdom, courage and temperance 
lead each its own sphere of conduct, while justice famously has an ordering 
role among the three parts of the soul (It is worth-mentioning that this 
Platonic account of justice is later supplemented by an Aristotelian notion of 
universal 'common justice').100 The only distinctive feature of Averroes's 
conception of the virtues that needs to be emphasized is his conviction that 
virtues can also be inculcated by coercion.101 It should be made clear that 
virtues, according to Aristotle's view, can be only taught to young people of 
well-born character who are naturally disposed toward what is fine and good. 
By contrast, the many obey, fear and avoid what is bad and antisocial only to 
achieve some share in virtue and show some degree of decency.102 However, 
it is a milestone of the Aristotelian EV that virtues can be exercised only on 
                                                 
99 ibid, p 87. 
100 See Averroes, Moralia Nicomachia, fol. 65 b. 
101 See Fakhry (fn 77), p 90. 
102 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1179 b 5-19. 
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the grounds of an autonomous choice: coercion leads the agent beyond the 
realm of virtue. 
 
Miskawayh focuses his attention on virtue as the perfection or excellence of 
the rational part of the soul. He seems strongly driven towards an 
intellectualist conception in which virtue belongs with knowledge and 
cognition, while the activities proper to the body are shunned. Miskawayh 
also follows the traditional Platonic tripartition of the soul between wisdom, 
courage and temperance; while, in an Aristotelian fashion, each virtue is 
described as a means between two extremes. It is to emphasize that from 
each of the cardinal virtues he derives, in a non-Aristotelian fashion, a table 
of intellectual and moral virtues which seem to mark some distance from 
their Greek predecessors.103 
 
A special mention is deserved by Miskawayh's treatment of two virtues as 
pre-eminent over all others: justice and friendship. The first is conceived in 
Platonic terms as an equilibrium resulting from the virtues of wisdom, 
temperance and courage. It is a mode of unity, in Platonic terms the 
'perfection of being'. In turn Miskawayh appears influenced by Aristotle in 
designing other distinctions within the concept of justice – we can find a 
heterogeneous element in his conception of 'divine justice'. This idea is 
located in the realm of metaphysics, according to a Platonic and Pythagorean 
view and Miskawayh goes on also to assert that in the Nicomachean Ethics the 
highest form of justice is that emanating from God.104 
 
As to friendship, this is taken by Miskawayh as the ideal condition of the 
human relationships. Justice comes in only when this noble disposition 
cannot be achieved. Most of what he says about forms and varieties of 
friendship is of Aristotelian inspiration but for his consideration of divine 
love (friendship) which has a clear neo-Platonic derivation – as in the case of 
divine justice. The love for his Creator entails obedience for and glorification 
                                                 
103 See Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, 19 ff. 
104 The Aristotelian source of this alleged statement is uncertain. See Fakhry (fn 77), p 
115 . 
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of God and it is a prerogative especially of the man of 'divine learning' because 
one can love deeply only what one knows.105  
 
We should now go back again to Al-Ghazali's ethics and consider his views 
on the virtues as a position which, although stemming to some extent from 
the classical conception, makes a few steps aside in the direction of a religious 
understanding of the virtues. A few points deserve explicit mention in Al-
Ghazali's EV. First, more than other Islamic thinkers, he locates the virtues 
within the context of the good character which is taken as an established 
state of the soul from which good actions – i.e. those which are praised by 
reason and the Sharia – proceed.106 This definition by Al-Ghazali marks a 
relevant difference with classical ethics insofar as the faculties of anger and 
desire have to yield to the dictates of reason and the Sharia. Following the 
previous presentation of the place of reason in Al-Ghazali's ethics, we should 
notice how its role is less crucial in comparison to classical EV. However, the 
inclusion of Sharia as a criterion of evaluation and judgment seems to help the 
work of reason rather than contrasting its determinations, as it happens in 
determining the mean for each virtue in different circumstances.107 
 
Second, 'the mean', the correct state of realizing each virtue, according to an 
Aristotelian doctrine that is also entirely endorsed by the Aquinas, is 
emphasized by Al-Ghazali for at least two reasons. The first reason is that it 
keeps the virtues in their worldly dimension because the state of the mean is 
determined by practical reason that mediates between two extremes, as in 
the case of courage that is a mean between a state of defect (cowardice) and a 
                                                 
105 See Miskawayh, Tahdhib al-Akhlaq (fn 83), p 147 ff; and the comment in Fakhry, (fn 
77), p 118. 
106 See Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum ad-Din, III, p 46. According to Al-Ghazali it is through 
'the conjunction of reason and revelation (al-aql, wa'l-shar) that the moral perfection 
of 'moderation' is achieved. Fakhry (fn 77), p 199. Fakhry correctly emphasizes the 
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struggling against passions (hawa) and the condition of overcoming and subduing 
them is the 'present heaven' of mankind. See Mizan al-Amal, p 48. This view appears 
as a clear remind of the Aristotelian harnessing of passions. 
107 See ibid, III, pp 84, 147. 
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state of excess (bravery): the same procedure applies in each sphere of 
conduct in which a virtue – e.g. temperance or generosity – comes in.108 
 
By contrast, the second reason that leads Al-Ghazali to emphasize the 
importance of the mean takes the mean towards the otherworldly dimension: 
keeping to the mean entails remaining as far as possible from the grasp of 
desires and, thus, achieving the greatest possible resemblance to the angels.109 
Good character can be achieved through the state of the mean as this results 
in the virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. In particular, Al-
Ghazali considers justice as the state of balance in which 'reason, desire and 
anger are kept in their proper place and given their due'.110 It is worth-
mentioning that, notwithstanding several resemblances with the classical 
conception of the virtues, the virtues just enumerated find their highest 
realization when getting close to the way of the Prophet.111 
 
Third, I believe it necessary to emphasize Al-Ghazali's view on the possibility 
of changing character through effort and appropriate moral training. It is a 
distinctive feature of his ethical thought and marks a point of difference with 
regard to classical EV. In acquiring good character Al-Ghazali mentions 
divine gift – for people who are good by nature – mortification and self-
training. The latter can be equated with 'habituation' which is the method of 
acquisition of the virtues most in line with the tradition of classical thought. 
By contrast, the idea of mortification is unknown to classical EV and derives 
from Al-Ghazali's conviction that it is possible to correct an evil character 
through the help of a spiritual guide. Such work of self-correction requires as 
                                                 
108 See ibid, III, pp 85-86, 199. 
109 See ibid, pp 50, 83. 
110 M A Quasem, The Ethics of Al-Ghazali (fn 76), p 85; see. Al-Ghazali, Al-Arba in fi Usul 
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first step the awareness of one's evil traits and a search for spiritual guidance. 
Second, the general method for healing diseases of the soul is by removing its 
causes. In other words, every vice should be removed by its opposites through 
knowledge and action.112 Once the man of vice is made aware – through his 
spiritual guide of the nature of his vice, its causes and its power of harming in 
this life or in the next – it is necessary to treat the vice through action. The 
action should be of a nature opposite to that of the vice in order to start the 
operation of removal of the latter. This 'practical remedy' of removal, as Al-
Ghazali calls it, requires a high degree of patience.113 Although the removal 
of evil character traits is accomplished through a man's conscious efforts, 
there is a supernatural element of divine grace. The purification of the soul is 
only accomplished by the grace of God and through his help.114 
 
In my view, there are two features in Al-Ghazali's account of the possibility 
of changing character which are worth-emphasizing. Both of them mark a 
difference between his ethics and the classical tradition. The first is the same 
idea of the change of character for adults which is unknown to writers such as 
Aristotle. He discusses the way to make young people virtuous through 
habituation, argument and the law. The latter and its sanctions are necessary 
for the many who cannot be stimulated towards what is fine and good. The 
many, Aristotle says, can obey for fear of sanctions and can at best become 
decent because it is unlikely to alter by argument what has long been 
absorbed by habit.115 In other words Aristotle does not believe in the 
possibility of transforming vicious people into fine and virtuous characters. 
Classical, worldly EV cannot propose such a move because it is a 
transformation which goes beyond its potentialities. Rather, it is the second 
distinctive feature in Al-Ghazali's views on this issue that makes the 
transformation possible. It is the appeal to divine grace, to the otherworldly 
element to mark the main difference with Aristotelian (and, generally, 
classical) EV. 
 
                                                 
112 See Al-Ghazali, Ihya Ulum ad-Din, III, p 129. 
113 See ibid, III, pp 173; IV, p 50. 
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That element finds full realization in the mystical virtues which Al-Ghazali 
takes as a necessary second stage after the purification of the soul through 
self-training and mortification. Most important among the mystical virtues 
are repentance, fear, ascetism, patience, gratitude, sincerity, truthfulness, 
trust, love and satisfaction. The seeker after God looks at a path that he has 
to ascend step by step toward the top where he finds love. The nature of a 
mystical virtue is at bottom that of a basic virtue in human nature. It is a 
disposition of the soul to which Al-Ghazali adds the element of knowledge 
and that of action. He takes knowledge of the benefit of a virtue to be the 
cause of the disposition and, in turn, this gives way to action.116 The 
acquisition of these mystical qualities is identified by Al-Ghazali as the 
enlightenment of the soul, the state which is most near to God and which can 
be attained only by the highest category of men: the mystics. They are 
qualities which lead to salvation, the highest form of happiness.117 It is quite 
plausible to recognize some degree of similarity between Al-Ghazali's 
mystical virtues and the Christian conception of the virtues, elaborated by 
philosophers (and doctors of the church) such as Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas.   
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
The often harsh conflictuality between Western and Islamic culture is surely 
grounded in a plurality of causes. My short inquiry has not taken into 
consideration political and economic causes of conflict. This would entail an 
entirely separate reflection. By contrast, I have dwelled on the ethical 
differences between the two cultures, focusing on three basic concepts: 
human rights (HR), maqasid al-Shariah and the virtues. My argument about 
HR basically consists of three points: first, notwithstanding their birth in a 
Christian and individualistic Western context, HR preserve their appeal also 
for large numbers of Muslims; second, a large part of the appeal of HR as an 
international standard relies on the general demand of some limits on 
government abuses against individual freedoms; third, what remains a point 
of divide between Western and Islamic culture is the ultimate submission of 
any human right to the evaluation according to Shariah criteria. 
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At this point the idea of maqasid comes in as a necessary supplement that may 
bring HR closer to Islamic culture. The argument about maqasid departs from 
the idea that if we accept an extensive reading of the concept that 
understands it as a core of human welfare and development, we may also 
define a better foundation for HR. In order to found the maqasid argument 
we do not rely only on Ramadan's proposal, but also, as I tried to show, on a 
tradition that goes back to al-Ghazali and al-Razi. On the grounds of the large 
range of Ramadan's maqasid we can establish a teleological foundation for 
HR. In turn, Nussbaum's Aristotelian approach to ethics defines a list of 
basic capabilities that, on the one hand, largely overlaps with the list of 
maqasid and, on the other, prepares the ground for the virtues as correct 
answers in the spheres of experience defined by the capabilities. Nussbaum 
proposes a list of virtues which follows closely Aristotle's classical virtues. 
They identify correct ways of choosing in the basic spheres of human 
experience. 
 
The third stage of the argument could not help being concerned with a 
summary examination of the major virtues. I tackle two main issues: first, the 
role of reason in ethical thought and the well-known debate between 
Mu'tazilite rationalist positions and the Ash'arite theistic views. This is a 
methodological issue that I have presented not only in the form of the crude 
opposition between Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite views, but also in the form of 
the more nuanced opposition between Hard Natural Law and Soft Natural 
Law. Each of these two theories is strictly connected respectively to 
Mu'tazilite and Ash'arite positions, but they are both offering an 
understanding of fact and value as a fusion that, in the case of Soft Natural 
Law, is tempered by the element of divine grace that leaves God free to alter 
his creation at any time. This approach also allows us to read an author usually 
enlisted on the voluntarist side, such as Al-Ghazali, as supporting rational 
inquiry in extending the application of the Sharia. He founds much of his 
work of interpretation on concepts such as maqasid and maslaha that give 
content and form to the ideas of rational purposes in the law and public good. 
Another important author that is discussed with regard to the issue of reason 
is Ibn Taymiyya, often considered as a banner of religious extremism. 
Following Vasalou's careful inquiry, it emerges that it is the notion of 'utility' 
that carries moral ultimacy, according to Ibn Taymiyya. It has an objective 
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ethical value that is paired by a Hume-like sentimentalist analysis of 
subjective emotive states and their value for us. 
 
The methodological dispute over the role of reason reflects also on the other 
issue that is tackled in this paper, that of the virtues. The virtues are examined 
through the work of philosophers such as Al Farabi, Ibn Rushd and 
Miskawayh, among others. Their theories are inclined mostly towards 
Aristotelian and Platonic virtues. Their appeal to fundamental virtues such 
as wisdom, courage, temperance or justice and friendship shows, in my view, 
that Nussbaum's overall reconstruction would not be foreign to their 
understanding of the virtues. Further, also in the work of a religious thinker 
such as Al-Ghazali, we find a basic Aristotelian scheme of virtues to which 
the religious element of the mystical virtues is added. The religious element 
remains an evident mark of difference with classical virtues but, it is worth-
emphasizing, no more so than what the religious element of Christianity led 
Aquinas's ethics to diverge to some degree from the Aristotelian view of the 
virtues. In concluding on this point, I consider it plausible to hold that insofar 
as the virtues can be taken as concepts whose thrust is largely overlapping 
with maqasid, they define some fundamental feature of the good life that can 
be accepted transculturally, both among Westerners – Christians and non-
Christians alike – and among Islamic devotees. Thus, it seems sound to some 
extent to hold that the virtues can be subsumed and integrated within a more 
flexible scheme that goes beyond HR: something similar to an enlarged 
'overlapping consensus'. 
 
Finally, one might wonder whether in the end this paper wants to offer a 
competitive approach to the mainstream one of human rights or, rather, 
whether it wants simply to integrate some classical idea in a liberal/modernist 
approach to Islamic ethics. The latter alternative makes more sense, in my 
view, because of the large number of Islamic writers that have taken seriously 
the possibility of an Islamic political regime based on liberal concepts, such 
as human rights. I should emphasize how an understanding compatible with 
some degree of liberalism already underlies what was already at work with 
many writers of the modernist Islamic movement of the 19th and 20th 
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century.118 However, in order to have the integration of the virtues in the 
liberal framework to work effectively I believe we should find some room for 
the virtues in a scheme of 'overlapping consensus' that takes them not as a 
'comprehensive conception' but as a crucial element of that (trans)cultural 
consent that allows a society to function correctly, even with strong degrees 
of cultural difference.  
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